A ring signature, also know as a Spontaneous Anonymous Group (SAG) or 1-out-of-n signature, convinces a verifier that a message is signed by any member in a group of n independent signers without allowing the verifier to identify who the signer was.
In their paper, "1-out-of-n Signatures from a Variety of Keys"[1], Abe, Ohkubo and Suzuki (AOS) present a method to construct a 1-out-of-n signature scheme that allows mixture use of different flavours of keys at the same time.
Liu, et al.[2] add the property of linkability to ring signatures. Linkability means that two signatures by the same signer can be identified as such, but the signer remains anonymous. It adds the feature of claimability, which allows a signer to claim responsibility by providing proof of having generated a given signature.
A LSAG signature scheme satisfies three properties:
- Anonymity: A signer cannot be distinguished from a pool of
t
commitments (public keys). - Spontaneity: No group secret, group manager of secret sharing setup stage.
- Linkability: Two signatures by the same signer can be linked.
It consists of two parts: signature generation and signature verification. Let L = {y0, ..., yt-1} be a list of t
public keys. Let H:{0, 1}* -> Zn where H
is a cryptographic hash function and n
is the order of the elliptic curve over a finite field Fq. For i ∈ {0, ..., t-1},
each user i
has a distinct public key yi and a private key xi.
Let k ∈ {0, ..., t-1} be the position of the prover's public key in the list L
of public keys. Let xk be its private key. The LSAG signature of a message m ∈ {0,1}* is generated by the following steps:
-
Compute h by encoding the hash of the public keys to a point in the curve, while hiding its discrete logarithm, and y = [xk] * h. Both computations are the product of a scalar and a point in the curve.
-
Select u ∈ Zn and compute the first challenge chk+1 = H(L, y, m, [u] * g, [u] * h)
-
For i in {k+1, ..., t-1, 0, ... k-1}, choose si ∈ Zn and compute the remaining challenges: chi+1 = H(L, y, m, [si] * g + [chi] * yi, [si] * h + [chi] * y)
-
With the last chk computed, calculate sk = (u - xk * chk) mod n
The signature is (ch0, [s0, ..., st-1], y).
Given a message m
, a signature of a message (ch0, [s0, ..., st-1], y) and a list of public keys L
, an honest verifier checks a signature as follows:
-
For i in {0, ..., t-1} compute chi+1 = H(L, y, m, [si] * g + [chi] * yi, [si] * h + [chi] * y), where h = [H(L)] * g.
-
Check whether c0 is equal to H(L, y, m, [st-1] * g + [cht-1] * yt-1, [st-1] * h + [cht-1] * y)
testSignature
:: ECC.Curve
-> Int
-> ByteString
-> IO Bool
testSignature curve nParticipants msg = do
-- Generate public and private keys
(pubKey, privKey) <- ECC.generate curve
-- Generate random foreign participants
extPubKeys <- genNPubKeys curve nParticipants
-- Position of the signer's key in the set of public keys
k <- fromInteger <$> generateBetween 0 (toInteger $ length extPubKeys - 1)
-- List of public keys
let pubKeys = insert k pubKey extPubKeys
-- Sign message with list of public keys and signer's key pair
signature <- sign pubKeys (pubKey, privKey) msg
-- Verify signature
pure $ verify pubKeys signature msg
References:
- M. Abe, M. Ohkubo, K. Suzuki. "1-out-of-n Signatures from a Variety of Keys", 2002
- K. Liu, K. Wei, S. Wong. "Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signature for Ad Hoc Groups", 2004
Notation:
[b] * P
: multiplication of a point P and a scalar b over an elliptic curve defined over a finite field modulo a prime number
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